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During the Great Recession, exceptionally harsh economic conditions were often countered by 
austerity policies that, according to many, further worsened and protracted the negative 
conjuncture. Both elements, the poor state of the economy and the contractionary manoeuvers, 
are supposed to reduce the electoral prospects for incumbents. In this article, we compare the 
relative explanatory powers of these two theories before and during the economic crisis. We 
demonstrate that in normal times citizens are fiscally responsible, whereas during the Great 
Recession, and under certain conditions, austerity policies systematically reduced the support 
for incumbents on top of the state of the economy. This happened when the burdens of the 
manoeuvers were shared by many, in more equal societies, when the country was constrained 
by external conditionalities, and when readjustments were mostly based on tax increases.    
Keywords: Economic vote; Austerity; Great Recession; Electoral behaviour; conditionality; 
inequality 
  
  
  
Introduction 
Political scientists and economists share a common concern regarding the relationship between the 
economic and the political arenas. The theory of economic voting postulates that voters evaluate the 
incumbent parties on the basis of their capacity to manage the economy. Citizens use this cognitive 
shortcut in order to decide if they should confirm or punish incumbents in the ballot. This theory 
has been extensively confirmed by numerous empirical analyses, and has proved to be adaptable 
with minor adjustments to normal and exceptional times (Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck, 2019a; 
Lewis-Beck and Lobo, 2017). 
Other scholars, mostly economists, postulate a different mechanism. Adopting a typical 
rational choice perspective, they connect the fiscal policy choices of incumbents, i.e. their chosen 
combination of revenues and expenditures, to the voters’ reaction.  
“Under the assumption that public output enters positively into the utility functions of citizens, 
the expenditure by itself will secure support for the politician. The taxes, however, will reduce 
the disposable income of citizens, thereby affecting them negatively and reducing support for 
the politician” (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977: 100).  
We name this perspective, which emphasizes the unpopularity of the reduction of the public deficit, 
the “theory of the electoral consequences of fiscal adjustments”, in short the “theory of austerity 
vote”. Also this approach has a long intellectual history, and has provided more fine-grained 
hypotheses for understanding what happened in the past and in the more recent period of the 
economic crisis. 
Both perspectives resonate well with the empirical evidence provided by the qualitative 
literature investigating the Great Recession. The harsh economic conditions mobilized citizens 
against their governments, producing in certain areas of the world what has been dubbed an 
“electoral and government epidemics” (Bosco and Verney, 2016). At the same time, the austerity 
policies adopted by many executives, following the advice of international and supranational 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the European Union, attracted their own 
  
share of criticisms, and triggered further dissatisfaction and contestation. From Zuccotti Park in 
New York to Syntagma Square in Athens, from the Austurvöllur in Reykjavík to the Puerta del Sol 
in Madrid, the protest took different forms, identified different targets, and had different electoral 
consequences also because of the specific combination of economic conditions and austerity 
policies peculiar to each national context. 
Yet the two approaches are not equivalent, and what they observe are not simply two sides 
of the same coin. The economic vote theory focuses on outcomes: the state of the economy. The 
theory of fiscal adjustment focuses on outputs: the deliberate choices of incumbents. The former 
approach is based on sociotropic evaluations, at least in its version based on objective data, whereas 
the latter is micro-founded on individual utility functions. The former perspective relies on an 
indirect judgment on a valence issue such as the managerial capacity of incumbents; the latter one 
on a direct judgment on a positional issue such as the adoption of an expansionary versus a 
contractionary fiscal policy. Moreover, the policy choices of incumbents are not simply dictated by 
events or the actual state of the economy, so that there is no correlation between macroeconomic 
indices and the incumbents’ policy choices. Faced by a similar crisis situation, policy-makers have 
reacted dissimilarly: forcing expansionary policies – consider the so-called Abenomics – or 
preferring a more austere approach – as happened in many European countries. 
Using a dataset composed of electoral and economic data relative to 36 democratic countries 
that went to the polls for a general election 159 times between the years 2000 and 2015, we aim at 
comparing the prediction of the above introduced theories, detailing their utility and explanatory fit 
in ordinary and in exceptional times, before and during the Great Recession. We demonstrate that 
the theory of economic voting has a wider application, although it is usefully complemented by the 
approach focused on fiscal adjustments in the period of the Great Recession. Furthermore, our 
analysis suggests that tax hikes are more dangerous for incumbents than expenditure cuts, and that 
more equally distributed costs entail a more systematic electoral reaction. 
  
The article first introduces the main elements of the two theories of electoral behaviour, and 
contextualizes their empirical validity in face of the events of the Great Recession. This discussion 
helps us to put forward our main working hypothesis regarding the impact of austerity. Next, we 
identify three sets of factors that should fine-tune that impact, and advance some corollary 
hypotheses regarding their conditional effect. We then describe our dataset, and justify the 
operationalization of the variables and the choice of the model. Eventually we present the results of 
our analyses, and then discuss them also considering the distributional problems connected to 
bearing the costs of the Great Recession. 
Theory: Electoral behaviour, state of the economy, and fiscal adjustments 
The theory of economic voting is the most relevant example of a theory of voting behaviour that 
starts from a retrospective evaluation. Voters, instead of looking forwards at the correspondence 
between their preferences and the policies promised by different parties, typically in their electoral 
platforms, look backwards at what incumbents have accomplished (Key, 1966). Amongst the wide 
range of issues that they may have tackled, economic problems are consistently perceived as the 
most significant in different contexts and periods, and for this reason incumbents are primarily 
judged against their record in managing the state of the country’s economy. According to this basic 
model, citizens do not need to be experts or thoroughly informed on the actual macro-economic 
figures in order to judge the economic conditions of their country (Fiorina, 1981). They form and 
continuously adjust their evaluation in many different ways, but mostly using some cognitive 
shortcuts and with a limited time horizon.  
The logic of this economic retrospective judgment can be empirically modelled in two ways: 
using subjective individual judgements, or aggregated objective indices (Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck 
and Park, 2017). Using survey data, it is possible to check directly the respondents’ evaluation of 
the incumbent’s performance, thus tackling at its origin the perspective of the agent, and the causal 
mechanism at play. At the same time, there is the risk of falling into the trap of endogeneity and 
  
reverse causality, whenever respondents align their judgment to their voting behaviour, by 
rationalizing the former on the basis of the latter (Evans and Pickup, 2010). This problem is not 
present in the work of scholars employing clearly exogenous data, like the objective 
macroeconomic conditions of the unit of interest. And yet this approach risks falling in another 
methodological trap, the one regarding the ecological fallacy: deriving individual behaviours on the 
basis of aggregated association. Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck (2014: 390) convincingly 
demonstrate that this potential risk, together with its opposite, the fallacy of composition, is 
empirically misplaced. Thanks to the “macro refutation of the micrological fallacy, along with the 
micro refutation of the ecological fallacy, (…) with unparalleled confidence, we can assert that 
economic voting is real, and really matters”. 
Testing that political reaction during the Great Recession posed new problems (Lewis-Beck 
and Lobo, 2017). For the micro-subjective approach, there is the problem of restricted variance. In 
that tough period, everyone correctly perceived a deterioration of the national economy; however, it 
is impossible to attribute the variable support of incumbents to a constant like that shared 
assessment. For the macro-objective approach, the problem is that of correctly specifying the 
model. The results obtained by using aggregated data were originally instable, and models have 
been carefully fine-tuned since Powell and Whitten (1993) analysis to improve their robustness. It is 
now fairly common to check for clarity of responsibility issues (Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck, 
2017; Silva and Whitten, 2017), as well as for other institutional and political confounding factors 
(Bengtsson, 2004).  
However, the Great Recession raised further challenges that needed to be tackled to gain 
better understanding of retrospective behaviours in normal and extraordinary times. For example, 
the global character of the crisis suggests that voters probably used different external benchmarks to 
evaluate their own economy in that period (Kayser and Peress, 2016). Furthermore, scholars need to 
reflect carefully on the actual quantity triggering the economic vote, the absolute state of the 
  
economy rather than its trend, and reconcile short-term and long-term forces affecting political 
behaviours (Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck, 2019a).  
The theory of the electoral consequences of fiscal adjustments starts from the utility 
functions of voters. The basic idea is that, all other things being equal, citizens appreciate 
governments that reduce their tax burden and expand their services, and disapprove those cabinets 
that increase taxes and reduce expenditures. Therefore, there would be an inherent pro-deficit bias 
in democratic politics (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977), whilst “large reductions of budget deficits 
(…would become) the kiss of death for the governments that implement them” (Alesina, Carloni 
and Lecce, 2013: 531). This baseline model brackets important issues, like, for example, partisan 
political preferences (Savage, 2019), trade-offs between revenues and outlays, the credibility of 
policy-makers (Alesina, Perotti and Tavares, 1998), external constraints (Hellwig, 2015), and long-
term economic sustainability (Alesina and Passalacqua, 2017).  
In an era that, well before the onset of the crisis, has been labelled of “permanent fiscal 
austerity” (Pierson, 2001), political scientists and welfare scholars have mostly underlined the 
institutional conditions for countering that inherent bias and avoid the blame for being fiscally 
responsible (Jensen and Mortensen, 2014). At the same time, other scholars, mostly economists, 
have directly challenged the idea that fiscal adjustments increase the probability of government 
turnover. Already in the 1990s, Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) showed that cabinets that cut 
deficits of even more than 1.5 percentage points of GDP were not punished by voters. They also 
ruled out the possibility that their findings were the product of reverse causation: by looking at the 
executive popularity before and after the fiscal adjustment, they falsified the hypothesis that only 
strong governments were those that could afford to tackle those supposedly unpopular policies. 
They thus confirmed that “electorates are fiscally ‘responsible’, that is, they do not like excessive 
deficits and understand that fiscal adjustments are sometimes necessary” (236).  
If the null hypothesis represents the standard defence of the electoral feasibility of fiscal 
adjustments, more recent work takes some steps forward. Brender and Drazen (2008) argued that 
  
“voters are likely to punish rather than reward persistent budget deficits over the leader’s term in 
office”.i  
Conditional expectations: Great Recession and austerity voting 
One limitation of most of these, even recent, economic analyses is that they focus on data until 
2008, leaving investigation of the most troublesome period of the Great Recession beyond their 
scope conditions. The whole idea of implementing austerity policies, often perceived as dictated by 
external non-elected bureaucrats, has recently become less appealing. After a brief period of 
expansionary reaction to the crisis (Blyth, 2013; Raess and Pontusson, 2015), fiscal contraction has 
become an important element in the punishment of governments, as Talving (2017) demonstrates 
using survey data. Governments can even be excused for not being able to maintain a healthy 
growth when the entire world economy is collapsing, but they cannot further put the costs of the 
recovery on the shoulders of their voters. According to Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino (2018), in the 
Eurozone, and especially in countries subject to the external supervision of the Troika, the blame 
for trying to be fiscally responsible extended well beyond the incumbents, incurring the same 
electoral fate for all the mainstream parties.  
Whereas in normal times, economic policies typically produce winners and losers, and there 
are usually minor fluctuations between expansionary and contractionary manoeuvres, the response 
to the Great Recession required a series of large adjustments, creating mostly, if not only, losers. 
Everyone had something to lose in such situations of fiscal restraint. Furthermore, whereas in 
normal times governments can better exploit political-economic cycles, the degrees of freedom for 
such opportunities were reduced during the Great Recession by the same downward dynamics of 
the economy, as well as by the external constraints of the international community. Finally, after the 
onset of the crisis, the way in which governments chose to react to the downturn of the economy 
came to the forefront of public attention. Incumbents were judged not only on what they had 
  
delivered, according to the standard economic vote theory, but also on how they had shared the 
burden of the intervention, i.e. on their austerity policies. Thus: 
Hp. 1: Besides the state of the economy, fiscal contraction decreased the electoral prospects 
of incumbents only after the onset of the crisis.  
This average expected effect may also depend on a series of conditioning  factors that 
should be considered in order to evaluate the potential for systematic punishment of incumbents due 
to their fiscal strategies. We identify three different sets of conditioning factors: social, institutional, 
and policy-related. 
Inequality represents the first conditioning social influence. Tests of the economic vote 
theory have often underlined that electoral behaviours are triggered more by sociotropic than by 
egotropic considerations. This should apply also to the austerity vote. If the burden of restrictive 
policies is placed only on specific social groups, which, all other things being equal, is more likely 
in less equal societies, incumbents should be rewarded by some and punished by others. This would 
translate into a non-significant coefficient for austerity in our model. This is exactly what happened 
before 2008, whereas the Great Recession increased the range of the negatively affected policy 
takers, so that most, if not all, could claim to have lost something. 
Whereas a certain degree of inequality and class conflict is inherent in any policy altering 
revenues and expenditures (Franko, Tolbert and Witko, 2013), it is clear that economies with 
greater imbalances between the wealthy and the poor can more easily transfer the costs of fiscal 
consolidation onto some section of society. Conversely, economies that are more egalitarian tend to 
share those costs, so that when they become sizable enough, they translate into a systematic 
electoral loss for incumbents.ii In other terms: 
Hp. 2: The impact of austerity on voting behavior was higher in more equal societies. 
A second, institutional, element concerns the issue of external conditionalities. One political 
problem with many austerity policies, apart from their dubious efficacy, was that they were 
externally imposed: by the global markets, the International Monetary Fund, or by the European 
  
Union. Contrary to those who argued that the multilevel structure of governance, by blurring the 
responsibilities, watered down the economic vote, some authors have contended that the inability to 
protect the national interest and sovereignty reinforced, rather than diminished, the dissatisfaction 
with incumbents (Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014; Giuliani, 2019).  
A fortiori this should apply also to austerity votes, since externally imposed restrictive 
policies are felt to betray the accountability of incumbents to domestic preferences. The clearest 
example of this type of exogenous constraint is represented by the policy conditionalities enforced 
by the IMF on countries borrowing from that international organization. There should thus be a 
multiplicative effect of the blame when incumbents introduce austerity policies to comply with such 
an external institutional restriction. 
Hp. 3: The impact of austerity on voting behavior was higher where (and when) those 
policies were dictated by the International Monetary Fund. 
Finally, our last conditioning dynamic has to do with the policy composition of the 
economic manoeuvre. Austerity policies may be predominantly tax-based rather than expenditure-
based. In the former case, fiscal surpluses are mostly obtained through increased revenues, while in 
the latter they are so mostly through service cuts. Admittedly, this is a very rough distinction, and 
the electoral effects of those choices may further depend on the specific structure of those taxes and 
cuts, on the targeted social groups, and on the political leaning of the incumbents adopting them. 
However, there are dynamics that may transcend those more fine-grained factors.  
All other things being equal, service and welfare cuts can be more easily tailored to specific 
sectors of society, whereas tax increases affect comparatively wider portions of society. The former 
may be extremely divisive, because they disproportionately affect some groups more than others. 
On the same grounds as we cited regarding inequality, they should not produce the same systematic 
punishment of incumbents as produced by tax hikes. Increasing the revenues, especially if intended 
to substantially tackle a country’s deficit, produces an all-losers situation. Acknowledging that the 
marginal imposition on some groups is heavier than on others does not alter the common 
  
punishment of the incumbents’ choices. In fact, Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (2019) suggest that 
“cases (of fiscal consolidation) in which the expenditure share of the adjustment was higher were 
associated with less frequent changes in government, (whereas) tax-based adjustments make it more 
difficult for incumbent governments to be reappointed” (178). 
Hp. 4: Austerity taxation triggered the punishment of incumbents more than cuts in 
spending did. 
 
Data, operationalization, and method 
The crisis affected the whole planet at various levels, and yet the more advanced economies have 
been upset more than the emerging markets. This is a first reason for concentrating only on well-
established economies, members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), and/or the European Union (EU). A second reason is that amongst that group of 
countries it is more probable to find consolidated democracies, the only type of regime for which 
elections and the retrospective evaluation of incumbents have a genuine meaning. A third selection 
criterion is more pragmatic, and it has to do with the availability of homogeneous economic data, 
especially insofar as government finances are concerned.  
The overlap of these three criteria left us with 36 countries. Most of them are located in 
Europe, and yet the sample includes also countries in North America, Asia and the Antipodes.iii The 
period considered was the one between 2000 and 2015, symmetrically divided before and after the 
onset of the crisis. We preferred not to further extend that period in the past to preserve that 
symmetry, and avoid including potential unnecessary confounding events. Although several 
economies technically exited swiftly from the Great Recession, some have not yet fully recovered. 
Moreover, the global memory of that period still survives, together with its enduring political 
consequences. During those years, in our sample countries, there were 159 general elections: 79 
before 2008, and another 80 afterwards.iv 
  
Our dependent variable was incumbent support measured as the cumulative percentage of 
votes received by all government parties. We preferred to use that aggregate measure instead of 
simply the support for the prime minister’s party because it better represents the mood in favour or 
against the government. Furthermore, in so doing, we avoided considering a simple transfer of votes 
amongst coalition partners as an increase or decrease of support for the government. Whereas in the 
elections considered in our models for the years between 2000 and 2007 incumbents lost on average 
3.5 percentage points, in the 2008-2015 period they lost on average 7.8 points against the previous 
election.  
We used the unemployment rate in the four quarters preceding the election to measure the 
state of the economy. Unemployment has the longest history as an index for retrospective studies 
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994), and it is the most direct measure 
of the grief produced by the Great Recession. Growth displays in that same period some irregular 
up-and-downs, and we included it mostly as a further control, to replicate as close as possible 
standard models of economic voting. 
As measure of austerity we employed the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
(Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi, 2019; Alesina and Giavazzi, 2013; Talving, 2017). “Essentially, the 
measure captures changes in expenditures and revenues that cannot be explained by rising claims 
for social benefits at constant benefits generosity and falling revenues at constant tax rates” (Raess 
and Pontusson, 2015: 6), thus focusing on “purposeful changes in spending and taxation” (Alesina, 
Perotti and Tavares, 1998: 214). We are aware of the ongoing debate in the field arguing in favour 
of the so-called narrative approach (Devries et al., 2011), relying on budget plans and 
documentation from national and international authorities. Apart from the difficulties in adapting 
this method to our temporal horizon, there is evidence of consistent non-random “consolidation 
promise gaps” (Gupta et al., 2018), i.e. differences between planned and realized fiscal adjustments 
that could affect the interpretation of our results should we adopt that alternative approach.  
  
Our index relied on estimates of the potential output of each economy. Its comparison thus 
required a homogeneous source of data, which induced us to use the IMF Fiscal Monitor dataset, 
which has the widest possible coverage of the advanced democratic economies chosen for this 
study. We adapted the annual measures to the timing of the election, using the same weighted 
average adopted for the economic variables described in the online appendix. Positive values of our 
austerity index meant an increase of the adjusted primary balance, i.e. contractionary policies 
involving a voluntary increase in taxation or a cut in spending, or both. Contrary to some common 
suppositions, there has been a great variation amongst austerity policies both before and after the 
onset of the Great Recession, as it is demonstrated in the descriptive part of the online appendix. 
In regard to our conditioning factors, we measured inequality using the Gini index computed 
on income distribution by the World Bank, the source that offered the widest cross-country and 
longitudinal coverage of our sample. Nonetheless, we had to resort to the multiple imputation 
strategy described in the online appendix to reduce the impact of missing values. The IMF 
conditionality was measured as a dummy variable assuming the value of 1 in those country-years in 
which there was a support agreement with the international organization. Finally, we computed an 
index representing the composition of the fiscal policy by subtracting the increase in the share of 
expenditures on GDP from the increase in the share of taxation. This index assumed a null value 
when a certain increase/decrease in revenues was balanced by the same increase/decrease in 
spending. Positive values of the index correspond to a tax-based austerity, whereas negative values 
are associated with policies based on spending cuts. 
The aggregated approach to retrospective voting usually requires a set of control variables. 
We accordingly included a dummy variable for coalition governments, for issues of clarity of 
responsibility (Silva and Whitten, 2017), as well as to absorb the inflation of votes in the case of 
multiple parties composing the executive. We further added the effective number of electoral 
parties to capture the availability of alternatives to incumbents (Rowe, 2015), and the change in the 
  
level of turnout against the preceding general election to hold constant the effect of the level of 
mobilization on vote choice (Weschle, 2014). 
Because of the cross-section time-series structure of our data, with more units than points in 
time (36 countries for a number of elections varying overall between 3 and 8), we used a panel 
regression with random effects. Our coefficients thus reflect mostly a cross-country effect, which is 
the same as saying that there was some common understanding of the depth of the crisis, and not 
just a relative evaluation against each own recent past. In fact, most of the variation was actually 
between-country, and a Hausman test on the complete models confirmed that random effects are to 
be preferred against using fixed effects.  
The latter would have implicitly modified our hypotheses into an investigation of the effects 
of changes in austerity policies on incumbents support, which is only part of our description of the 
correlates of different amounts of austerity (Neumayer and Plümper, 2017). In accordance with 
standard practices (Angrist and Pischke, 2009), we introduced a lagged dependent variable to 
account for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity and to further control for the size of each 
incumbent executive, and for unmodelled specificities of each electoral context. 
Finally, we adopted a split sample research design that made the comparison much clearer, 
though interacting our covariates with a crisis dummy confirmed the same findings. Our 
methodological choices and alternative models are further discussed in the online appendix. 
Austerity over and above the economy? 
We started by regressing the support for incumbents on the state of the economy before the Great 
Recession, and then we added our austerity measure. Next, we replicated the same two steps for the 
period after the onset of the crisis. The results of these first four analyses are presented in Table 1. 
The first model empirically translated the standard theory of retrospective economic voting. 
The coefficients for unemployment and growth presented the expected opposite signs, although 
  
only the former was statistically significant. For each point of the rate of unemployment incumbents 
lost slightly more than 1 percent of their votes.  
Cursory inspection of the control variables shows that the coefficient for the incumbents’ 
vote in the previous election indicates a non-marginal degree of persistence of the government 
support. The dummy for coalition has the expected positive sign, with the lack of clarity partially 
restoring a fraction of the lost votes; however, the coefficient is not statistically significant. The 
presence of many electoral alternatives, represented by the proxy for the effective number of 
parties, systematically reduces the incumbents’ chances of being confirmed in the ballot. The sign 
of the coefficient for the change in the turnout levels is coherent with the mobilization hypothesis, 
with unsatisfied citizens using their votes to favour some alternation in power. 
Model 2 added to the previous equation the government’s austerity policies, measured as an 
increase in the cyclically adjusted primary balance. The coefficient for austerity was statistically 
insignificant, mirroring the conclusion of Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) regarding fiscally 
responsible citizens that do not punish governments that cut deficits. Although this result does not 
support the idea that the electorate actually rewards the supposedly necessary fiscal adjustments, it 
certainly disconfirms the basic rational choice assumption according to which the electorate always 
rewards expansionary policies.  Alternatively, endogenizing that same assumption, executives act 
strategically by avoiding approval of any fiscal consolidation shortly before the ballot (Hübscher 
and Sattler, 2017), thus reducing the variation in the pre-electoral manoeuvres so that it is 
impossible to register any significant impact of that variable. 
This model had a slightly better fit than the first equation, although the somewhat higher 
explained variance may have been a statistical artifact resulting from having one more variable in 
the right-hand side of the equation.  This regression only confirms the robustness of economic 
voting, without showing any additional explanatory contribution on behalf of the austerity variable. 
Viewed from a different perspective, this lack of statistical significance is grist to the mill of those 
who counterintuitively argue that fiscal rigor is not as unpopular as generally thought, so that 
  
policy-makers should be less reluctant to introduce the required retrenchment policies (Alesina, 
Favero and Giavazzi, 2019; Alesina and Passalacqua, 2017; Brender and Drazen, 2008). 
 
***Table 1 approximately here 
 
Are the results for the period of the Great Recession similar to those that we have presented 
for normal times? Models 3 and 4 replicated the previous two regressions, and immediately 
apparent are some interesting differences.  
First, the theory of economic voting is confirmed even in turbulent times, substantiating 
what has already been shown by other scholars using partially different samples of countries, sets of 
covariates, data sources, and types of model (e.g. (Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck, 2014; Lewis-
Beck and Lobo, 2017). From a cross-country perspective, the absolute level of unemployment 
continues to impact robustly on the electoral performances of incumbents, and it is further 
complemented in both models by growth, thus confirming the political centrality of the economy in 
those troubled years. 
Secondly, on adding austerity to the equation, also the theory on the electoral consequences 
of fiscal adjustments seems to be confirmed in the hard times of the Great Recession. In model 4, 
unemployment and growth kept their systematic effect, but, on top of the economic vote, for each 
point of fiscal consolidation incumbents lost almost 1.3 points in the ballots. In our sample, the 
number of countries that, summing up all the annual structural adjustments, had an overall fiscal 
contraction more than doubled in 2008-2015 compared to the previous period. The overall average 
of those sequences before the crisis was expansionary (-1.3 in the structural primary balance), 
whereas after the onset of the recession the same measure registered a contractionary positive value 
of 0.8, with  cycles of austerity packages peaking above a 10-point adjustment in countries like 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Iceland.v Austerity clearly came to the forefront in that period, both 
  
because of its extent and magnitude, and because of  its frequent perception as the wrong cure for 
the ongoing disease (Blyth, 2013). 
Interestingly, our models fit the crisis period better than the one before 2008, with a parallel 
increase of the explained variance in both types of equations, and with an overall R-squared 
reaching 60% for the last full model. As regards the control variables, they mostly behave as before 
the crisis, with the exception of the trend in turnout, whose coefficient is now positive: the more 
people voted, the better the incumbents’ results, meaning that some of the dissatisfaction regarding 
their managerial capacities was funnelled into abstention (Giuliani and Massari, 2018). 
Having verified our first hypothesis, it is time to fine-tune it by checking if also some of our 
conditional expectations are confirmed. Their nature recommends the direct plotting of the marginal 
effects of austerity at varying degrees of the interacting factors, which is what we do in figure 1 by 
starting with inequality and then moving to the IMF conditionality and to the different balance 
between expenditure cuts and tax increases in the composition of fiscal policies.vi Admittedly, the 
interactive effect is weak, and the inevitably small number of observations – even this protracted 
crisis was limited in time – widens the 95% confidence intervals. Nonetheless, in each of our plots, 
the impact of austerity is significantly different from zero on one of the two extremes of the 
conditional variable, and not on the other, confirming the sizeable relevance of the interaction. 
In regard to the conditioning role of inequality, our hypothesis was that austerity policies 
exerted their negative electoral impact mostly in less unequal societies, where the fraction of policy-
takers affected by those fiscal decisions can be bigger. The upper panel of figure 1 corroborates this 
expectation. For more than half of the cases in our sample, fiscal consolidation has a systematic 
negative impact on the electoral prospects of incumbents. The absolute magnitude of that impact 
diminishes at increasing levels of inequality, until it cannot be distinguished from zero when the 
Gini index exceeds approximately the value of 32. We can thus confirm that income imbalances 
counterintuitively moderate the magnitude of the electoral impact of austerity policies, which has 
  
nothing to do with the potential direct losses due to inequality in itself (Dassonneville and Lewis-
Beck, 2019b). 
 
*** Figure 1 approximately here  
 
The second conditioning factor has to do with the constraints imposed on sovereign fiscal 
choices associated with the recovery programs offered by the Monetary Fund. Scholars testing the 
impact of those external conditionalities using individual (survey or experimental) data have 
obtained mixed results (Kosmidis, 2018; Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso, 2017; Talving, 2017). In the mid 
panel of figure 1, we replicated those tests using objective aggregate data and interacting austerity 
with conditionality. The marginal effects suggest that citizens find particularly hateful the external 
imposition of blood and tears fiscal adjustments, and thus punish their incumbents for having 
produced that state of affairs. The point estimate for non-supported countries is still slightly 
negative, but for them the standard 95% confidence intervals implies a null effect of fiscal policies 
on electoral behaviors. Typically, austerity and IMF intervention went hand in hand, with the 
harshest policies that have been introduced in countries that had abdicated their fiscal sovereignty to 
international organizations. 
Finally, the bottom panel of figure 1 explores the idea that only certain types of austerity 
program give the kiss of death to incumbents (Alesina and Giavazzi, 2013). The interaction had to 
exclude two extreme elections, i.e. those in Estonia and Ireland in 2011, since the indexes of the 
relative composition of their fiscal policies were respectively two and three times smaller/higher 
than the most proximate case on the opposite sides of the scale. The plot of the marginal effects 
confirms that manoeuvres centered around expenditures cuts do not suffer from the same electoral 
side effects as those grounded in tax increases, and the more austerity exacts a toll directly on 
citizens’ pockets, the more it is risky for those in government.vii These provisional results, further 
corroborated by some robustness checks in the online appendix, are coherent with the normative 
  
and empirical contention by Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (2019: chapter 10) that tax-based 
adjustments are both politically and economically ineffective. 
Discussion 
Austerity, as a concept, has a long tradition in the history of political and economic thought. 
Whereas discussion on its moral flavour was predominant at its origin, it was not until modern 
times that scholars like Adam Smith and Max Weber “introduced their readers to a world in which a 
select few, in possession of virtue and economic reason, adopted austere ways of life and were 
amply rewarded later. In contrast, Karl Marx and Thorstein Veblen conjured up a world in which 
there was nothing virtuous or rational about abstinence. Above all, in their view, the people doing 
the abstaining and those reaping the benefits were members of different groups” (Schui, 2014: 50).  
To cut a longer story (Blyth, 2013) short, that contrast is still present in contemporary 
economic thought and practices.  While Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi argue that “austerity is 
almost always the correction of past mistakes” and that “expansionary austerity” is indeed possible 
(2019: 194,196), Varoufakis dubs the austerity packages imposed on Greece as “fiscal 
waterboarding” (2018: 29). Since the onset of the Great Recession, the IMF itself seems to have at 
least partially changed its stance regarding the quantity and timing of the fiscal consolidation it 
imposed on the economies in crisis (Clift, 2018). 
In this study, we have demonstrated that, under certain conditions, those policies reduced 
the electoral support for incumbents besides what the actual state of the economy already eroded. 
Our evidence, based on aggregated objective indicators, matches what others have shown using 
individual data or qualitative reconstructions (Bosco and Verney, 2016; Talving, 2017), and also 
agrees with those scholars pointing at the disturbing effect of having sacrifices imposed by outside 
international organizations (Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014).  
 Nevertheless, some previous studies maintained that austerity policies are not politically so 
detrimental (Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi, 2019; Alesina and Giavazzi, 2013; Brender and Drazen, 
  
2008). How can we reconcile their null results with our more sceptical view? A short answer could 
be that those studies watered down a relationship specifically triggered by the economic crisis by 
covering a longer time frame which only marginally overlapped with the Great Recession. Our 
Table 1 already revealed that before the onset of the crisis we did not observe the same depressing 
effect of fiscal consolidation on the electoral chances of incumbents. At that time, because of the 
relatively smaller size of the adjustments, as well as because of the shorter sequences and minor 
parallel diffusion of those contractionary manoeuvres, the theory of economic voting sufficed to 
explain the dynamics of political behaviours.  
A second reason is that, whereas we explain the electoral success of incumbents, those 
studies typically checked the impact of austerity on government turnover, variously defined.viii The 
difference is not only an issue of model specification. An electoral defeat does not automatically 
translate into a government change, and even the success of the incumbents is not a guarantee of 
confirmation in power. Apart from the purest types of Westminster systems, the appointment of a 
cabinet is very much an issue of arithmetic and political feasibility of alternative coalitions (Laver 
and Benoit, 2015). Thus, as Alesina and colleagues acknowledge (2019: 181), “reelection of 
governments (…) is a highly complex matter with many moving parts and many factors in place. As 
a result, isolating the role of fiscal adjustments in any statistical analysis may be difficult”. 
Looking at electoral results is much more straightforward and instructive, not least because 
it relies on a direct relationship between retrospective evaluation (of the economy and/or past 
policies) and citizens’ behaviour, and avoids including unnecessary confounding factors. During the 
Great Recession, the gap between the results obtained by using the two different dependent 
variables increased because of the volatility of voters in regard to non-mainstream radical parties. 
Since the latter have been typically non-viable partners in coalitions, their electoral successes did 
not translate consistently in government turnovers, further justifying the mismatch between the two 
types of model. 
  
Thirdly, if austerity aims at competing with the state of the economy for the role of driver of 
electoral behaviours, we should again consider the issue of egotropic versus sociotropic 
perspectives that occupied the debate within the theory of economic voting. As with the latter, the 
two approaches do not need to be in any type of contradiction. Citizens could oppose hard austerity 
policies even without being directly affected by the specific tax increases or service cuts planned in 
those manoeuvres. Yet it is evident that austerity policies have an innate redistributive problem, as 
we underlined at the beginning of this section by citing Marx and Veblen.  
The results of our conditional models call for a further in-depth analysis of the 
differentiating factors that magnify or moderate the electoral punishment of similar fiscal 
readjustments. In this regard, the statistical power of some of our models was limited by the number 
of observations and by some missing fiscal information. Nonetheless they all tell an interesting and 
different story. Equality and inequality are similarly distributed in countries assisted or not by the 
IMF, and the Gini index is not related to the tax-expenditure composition of fiscal policies either. 
Tax-based manoeuvres are admittedly typical of countries subject to lending agreements, but are 
still much more frequent than those 10% of our observations conditioned by the IMF.  
By enlarging the share of those who suffered from the state of the economy and from the 
policies to counter that state of affairs, the Great Recession has probably reduced the gap between 
sociotropic and egotropic considerations. Yet it has also enlarged the one between output and 
outcome, with severe fiscal restraints and responsibilities not matched by a sufficiently swift 
economic recovery. Normatively speaking, the good news for democracy, and for the theory of 
political representation, is that, especially in equal societies, policy-makers have several incentives 
for being responsive to their principals. The bad news is that the Great Recession has eroded the 
traditional basis of democratic cohabitation beyond the usual alternation in government, with 
consequences that persist well after the end of the economic emergency. For this reason, further 
investigation of what happened in the extraordinary years of the Great Recession is still important: 
because they may become the new ordinary times.  
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Table 1. Economic and austerity vote before and after the crisis 
 Before the crisis 
(2000-2007) 
During the crisis 
(2008-2015) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Lagged vote 0.55*** 0.64*** 0.78*** 0.78*** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) 
Unemployment -1.14*** -0.82** -0.61*** -0.49** 
 (0.32) (0.37) (0.21) (0.22) 
Growth 0.78 0.79 0.87** 0.85** 
 (0.49) (0.50) (0.41) (0.40) 
  
Austerity  0.52  -1.28** 
  (1.15)  (0.63) 
Coalition 4.82 5.73* 0.82 1.48 
 (2.97) (2.99) (2.76) (2.74) 
Enep -1.70** -1.45* -1.30* -1.29* 
 (0.84) (0.88) (0.69) (0.68) 
Trend turnout -0.26* -0.15 0.30* 0.28* 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) 
Constant 26.19*** 18.75** 13.24** 11.49** 
 (6.71) (7.79) (5.25) (5.25) 
     
Observations 79 70 80 80 
R-squared 0.470 0.525 0.577 0.599 
Countries 36 34 36 36 
Random effects; Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Three conditional factors on the austerity vote 
  
Online Appendix to 
Economy or austerity. Drivers of retrospective voting  
before and during the Great Recession. 
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The Dataset 
 
In what follows we present the codebook of the main variables included in the dataset, specifying 
the source of the information. For replication, the dataset is available on the author’s personal 
webpage and uploaded in Harvard dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RNXBS6  
 
Table A.1 Codebook main variables in the dataset 
Variable Description Source 
votesgov and 
lagvotesgov 
Aggregated pct votes of incumbent parties 
in an election and in the previous election 
Parlgov, Wikipedia 
deltaturnout Trend in turnout: Change in turnout against 
the previous election 
Parlgov, Wikipedia 
enep Effective number of electoral parties Parlgov, Wikipedia 
coalition Dummy variable for coalition Parlgov, Wikipedia 
crisis Dummy variable for the period 2008-2015  
wunemployment Weighted unemployment rate in the 4 
trimesters before the elections. 
Unemployment rate computed as quarterly 
weighted average of the annual 
unemployment rates in the years before the 
election. E.g. if an election took place in May 
2010 (i.e. in the second quarter of 2010) we 
produced a weighted index composed by ¼ 
IMF – Fiscal Monitor 
October 2018 
 
The prefix “w” in 
each variable reflects 
a similar weighted 
average, 
  
of the annual 2010 rate and by ¾ of the 
annual 2009 rate  
wgrowth Weighted growth computed as quarterly 
weighted average of the annual growth 
levels in the years before the election, as in 
wunemployment 
 
IMF – Fiscal Monitor 
October 2018 
wdeltaadjprimarybalanc
e 
Austerity index. Change in the weighted 
cyclically adjusted primary balance (the 
weight is computed as in the previous 
economic variables) 
IMF – Fiscal Monitor 
October 2018 
 
wdeltaexpenditures Change in the expenditures as percentage of 
the GDP 
IMF – Fiscal Monitor 
October 2018 
 
wdeltarevenues Change in the revenues as percentage of the 
GDP 
IMF – Fiscal Monitor 
October 2018 
 
imf Dummy variable for IMF conditionality IMF 
https://www.imf.org
/external/np/pdr/mo
na/index.aspx 
taxbase Index for expenditure- vs tax-based 
austerity. (wdeltarevenues – 
wdeltaexpenditures) 
IMF – Fiscal Monitor 
October 2018 
 
  
wgini Gini index (weighted according to the timing 
of the election) used for the multiple 
imputation 
World bank 
wginiadjusted Adjusted Gini index (then weighted 
according the timing of the election), filling 
in between missing values with the average 
(only for the online appendix) 
World bank 
 
 
  
  
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table A.2 The average state of the economy (unemployment, growth, primary balance and debt) 
 2000-2007  2008-2015 
 Unemp Growth 
Primary 
balance 
Gross 
debt  Unemp Growth 
Primary 
balance 
Gross 
debt 
Australia 5.6 3.4 1.3 13.4  5.4 2.6 -2.9 25.5 
Austria 4.8 2.4 0.3 66.1  5.1 0.6 -0.6 80.4 
Belgium 7.7 2.3 4.2 98.9  7.9 0.8 -0.3 102.2 
Canada 7.0 2.9 2.8 74.8  7.3 1.6 -1.3 82.0 
Croatia 18.7 4.5 -2.7 37.6  17.1 -1.0 -2.7 66.8 
Cyprus 4.3 4.1 0.0 59.8  10.2 -0.6 -0.6 76.8 
Czech Republic 7.6 4.6 -3.4 25.7  6.3 1.1 -1.8 38.8 
Denmark 4.6 1.9 4.0 42.1  6.5 0.3 -0.7 41.9 
Estonia 9.7 8.0 1.3 4.9  10.0 0.1 -0.6 8.1 
Finland 8.7 3.5 4.0 40.1  8.1 -0.6 -1.6 50.5 
France 8.6 2.1 -0.1 63.0  9.5 0.6 -2.6 87.4 
Germany 9.3 1.7 0.2 62.6  6.0 1.0 0.9 75.0 
Greece 10.1 4.1 -1.1 104.4  18.9 -3.7 -3.0 157.4 
Hungary 6.5 3.8 -2.6 58.4  9.5 0.6 0.4 77.3 
Iceland 2.7 5.1 2.3 33.8  5.7 0.7 -2.7 80.2 
Ireland 4.7 5.8 2.5 29.0  12.6 3.9 -8.2 90.2 
Israel 11.6 3.9 1.6 84.9  7.1 3.5 -0.2 69.0 
Italy 8.1 1.5 1.8 102.1  9.8 -1.0 1.0 120.3 
Japan 4.7 1.5 -5.1 163.1  4.3 0.4 -6.6 217.9 
Korea 3.7 5.4 2.8 22.6  3.4 3.1 0.3 33.3 
Latvia 10.9 8.5 -0.6 11.8  13.6 -0.5 -1.6 34.0 
Lithuania 11.1 7.6 -1.0 19.8  12.2 1.0 -2.9 34.8 
Luxembourg 3.3 4.6 1.4 7.1  6.1 1.7 0.4 19.9 
Malta 7.5 1.9 -1.0 67.0  6.7 3.8 0.4 65.8 
Netherlands 4.5 2.3 1.3 47.4  5.7 0.5 -1.8 61.6 
New Zealand 4.6 3.7 4.9 23.4  5.6 2.0 -1.2 30.8 
Norway 3.8 2.5 11.2 39.7  3.6 1.0 9.3 35.3 
Poland 16.7 4.0 -1.4 43.1  8.9 3.2 -2.3 51.7 
Portugal 6.1 1.5 -2.1 60.7  12.3 -0.6 -3.1 109.0 
Slovakia 16.8 5.7 -3.1 39.8  12.9 2.2 -3.0 45.3 
Slovenia 6.2 4.3 0.2 26.8  7.9 -0.2 -3.6 53.5 
Spain 10.5 3.8 2.3 46.6  21.0 -0.4 -5.8 75.3 
Sweden 6.6 3.3 2.5 47.2  7.8 1.4 -0.1 40.2 
Switzerland 2.9 2.5 0.6 54.2  3.1 1.4 0.9 43.5 
United Kingdom 5.2 2.8 -0.4 37.8  7.1 0.9 -4.9 76.7 
United States 5.0 2.7 -1.2 61.2  7.6 1.4 -5.6 96.7 
 
  
The data reported in Table A.2 illustrate the state of the economy in the two periods considered by 
our analysis. They represent the average of the whole series of annual economic indices downloaded 
from the IMF Fiscal monitor.  
The summary statistics reported in Table A.3 refer instead to the values estimated in the year (i.e. 
four trimesters) before the election, following the conventional measure described in the article and 
in Table A.1 (i.e. weighting the annual values according to the trimester of the election). They confirm 
the high variability in all the variables used both across and within each of the two periods.  
Regarding the political variables, the Great Recession evidenced a clear average increase in the cost 
of governing (i.e. decrease in the change of votes for incumbent parties) yet without any significant 
change in the range of this variable. We observed the same cross-period variability also regarding the 
trend in turnout, though in a slightly more fragmented context (a 10% increase in the effective 
number of parties). 
 
Table A.3 Descriptive statistics of the main variables in the two periods, estimated in the year 
before the election  
 Before (2000-2007)  During (2008-2015) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min / Max  Mean Std. Dev. Min / Max 
Trend votes (pct) -3.49 9.85 -45.5 / 13.4  -7.83 10.25 -48.1 / 13.1 
Unemployment 7.25 3.67 2.8 / 19.2  8.60 4.86 3.0 / 26.5 
Trend 
unemployment 
-0.26 0.94 -4.1 / 2.6  0.23 1.29 -2.2 / 5.5 
Growth 3.47 2.28 -0.2 / 11.6  0.98 2.53 -8.65 / 5.1 
Primary balance 0.62 3.36 -6.8 / 12.4  -2.10 4.88 -29.7 /11.8 
  
Gross Debt 54.58 33.81 4.4 / 174.2  69.26 44.69 6.6 / 235.2 
Austerity -0.35 1.04 -3.3 / 2.0  0.02 1.59 -6.4 / 5.0 
Trend turnout -0.95 6.54 -18.2 / 19.1  -0.92 5.88 -20.4 / 19.7 
Enep 4.55 1.66 2.0 / 9.9  4.99 1.84 2.0 / 11.0 
Inequality 31.61 4.07 24.8 / 41.7  32.20 4.30 24.1 / 41.8 
Note: Data refer to cases included in the complete model of Table 1 
 
In regard to the economic variables, although some swift recovery from the crisis moderated the 
comparison between the two periods, the Great Recession produced an overall deterioration of the 
economic environment in the whole 7-year period, i.e. also some years after its onset. Compared to 
the pre-crisis period there was higher (+1.4%) and increasing unemployment (+0.5%), widespread 
stagnation (almost -2.5% in growth), negative primary balance (-2.7%) and increasing debt (+14.7%).  
Countries reacted differently to this global context, and though there was an average increase in 
restrictive policies (i.e. greater austerity), there was also an increase in their diversity. Usually, the 
political cycle suggests moderation in election years, and this is reflected in the difference between 
our summary statistics and the high variability in austerity policies shown in Figure A.1 for both 
periods.  
More in detail, there were contractionary policies – i.e. a positive change in the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance against the previous year – even before 2018, and expansionary ones even after the 
onset of the crisis. The scatterplot of figure A.1 illustrate the cross-country and cross-time variation 
in this austerity measure. 
 
  
 
Fig. A1 Austerity measure (change in adjusted primary balance)  
 
 
 
Alternative models 
 
An alternative to our Random Effects (RE) panel regression would have been using Fixed Effects (FE), 
as standard way to cope with unobserved heterogeneity. We here explain why, in our specific 
circumstances and for our research design, this wouldn’t have been a sound choice, report the 
alternative results of the baseline complete models of Table 1 using FE (instead of our strategy with 
lagged dependent variable and RE), and the results of the corresponding Hausman tests.  
  
Table A.4 reports the coefficient for these alternative models. 
 
Table A.4 The alternative specification with Fixed effects 
 (1) (2) 
   
   
Unemployment -1.65* -0.67 
 (0.90) (0.48) 
Growth 0.87 0.95 
 (0.78) (0.64) 
Austerity 0.89 -1.16 
 (1.46) (0.82) 
Coalition 7.82 5.66 
 (5.47) (5.99) 
Enep -3.66** 0.87 
 (1.77) (1.70) 
Trend turnout -0.19 0.09 
 (0.19) (0.20) 
Constant 61.86*** 35.62*** 
 (11.22) (8.86) 
   
Observations 70 80 
Countries 34 36 
rho 0.71 0.59 
Fixed effects; Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As it can be seen, the signs of the covariates of interests are correct (or in line with the RE models), 
but almost never significant, especially during the crisis period.  
Firstly, from a statistical perspective, there is not enough statistical power in the sample to use FE:  
• most of the variance in the support for incumbents is cross-country, and not longitudinal: 
running standard FE highlights that between 60% and 70% of the variance is cross-panel (this 
quantity even reaches 80% of the overall variance in case of some conditional models in the 
second part of the article). 
• FE work better with longer time series, but only one country out of four had more than two 
elections before or during the crisis: i.e. since “FE models can say (…) only about deviations 
from the mean over time” (Bell, Fairbrother and Jones, 2018: 1058), it is not surprising that 
they did not fit well in our analysis. As an indirect proof of this argument, also the standard 
variables of the economic vote in Table A.4 – unemployment and growth – turned out to be 
mostly not significant using that approach. 
  
• the option of extending the sample to increase the statistical power was unavailable, since 
the sample actually covered the universe of economically advanced and consolidated 
democracies. By enlarging the sample in a cross-country direction, we would have included 
either non-democratic countries or non-advanced economies, which would have resulted in 
confounding the actual meaning of the indices (punishing incumbents in non-democratic 
settings, or levels of unemployment in non-developed economies have different meanings). 
Extending the temporal horizon would have been impossible: we chose 2015 as final date 
because in that year, the labour market of most of the countries included in the sample had 
returned to pre-crisis levels. 
Secondly, methodologically speaking, and as argued by Bell and Jones (2014: 134), “FE models 
effectively cut out much of what is going on — goings-on that are usually of interest to the researcher, 
the reader and the policy maker”. As clarified in the previous paragraph, most of those “goings-on”, 
the between-countries variation, would have been cancelled by the use of FE. In these situations, as 
Neumayer and Plümper (2017: 134-135) explain “Between-variation is information. Differencing and 
fixed-effects estimation eliminate valuable information. In fact, both techniques eliminate more 
information – all the between-variation – than they would do in an optimal world, in which they 
would merely eliminate the variance of the regressors correlated with the omitted time-invariant 
variables. This leads to a loss of efficiency, which can be substantial if the within-variation is low and 
the between variation is high” (which is our case). Furthermore, FE also “implicitly change the 
hypotheses tested in subtle ways” (Neumayer and Plümper, 2017: 135): from ‘the more austerity, 
the more electoral punishment’ to ‘the larger the increase in austerity (within the same unit), the 
more electoral punishment’. Incidentally, adopting OLS with robust or country-clustered standard 
errors returns substantially similar results for the crisis period. 
Thirdly, although it is a standard econometric practice to use FE to cope with unobserved 
heterogeneity, it very much depends on the quality of that heterogeneity, which is only presumed to 
be time-invariant. “For many causal questions, the notion that the most important omitted variables 
are time invariant doesn’t seem plausible”(Angrist and Pischke, 2009: 243). Otherwise, the solution 
could be worse than the problem. An alternative option is to use a lagged dependent variable in the 
  
right-hand side of the equation (as we did). Also this solution has its own limits, as pointed out by 
Achen (2001), but it is not without some merits (Beck and Katz, 2011; Keele and Kelly, 2017).  
Whereas scholars should ideally aim at robust results indifferent to the model specifications, thus 
trying both FE and LDV models (Angrist and Pischke, 2009), this option does not always work. In that 
event, statistical tests could help in making the most appropriate choice. In our case, using the 
Hausman test to compare the first option against random effects models, always indicated adopting 
a RE specification. Before the Great Recession, contrasting FE and RE models, the test for the null 
hypothesis of non-systematic differences was greater than 0.22, whereas during the crisis greater 
than 0.95.  
 
  
  
Interactive (vs. split sample) research design 
 
In the analysis reported in this article, we preferred to adopt a split-sample research design because 
of its immediate appeal and intuitive interpretation. Yet our findings were confirmed even when 
interacting our covariates with a dummy variable representing the crisis period.  
In figure A.2 below we plot the marginal effect of our covariates, bearing in mind that “the analyst is 
not directly interested in the significance or insignificance of the model parameters per se” (Brambor, 
Clark and Golder, 2006: 70), but should rather “plot q ˆ y=qx over an appropriate range of z along 
with confidence intervals” (Kam and Franzese, 2007: 46) and superimpose the “frequency 
distribution for the variable on the horizontal axis” (Berry, Golder and Milton, 2012: 16). 
 
 
  
 
 
Fig. A.2 Marginal effects (with 95% confidence intervals) of economic and policy variables 
(separated) on the percentage of votes gained by incumbent parties before and during the crisis 
 
Figure A.2 reproduces the marginal effects of economic and policy variables before and during the 
crisis, thus replicating with a different strategy the full models (2 and 4) of table 1 in the text. 
In both cases, we observe:  
a) The enduring significance of the levels of unemployment before and during the crisis, 
confirming the economic voting theory in ordinary and exceptional periods; furthermore, the 
effect of this variable is clearer in tough times, as testified by the smaller confidence intervals. 
  
b) The increasing importance of the economy in the extraordinary period of the Great Recession, 
in which also growth (on top of unemployment) impacts on the electoral fate of incumbents. 
c) The diverse impact of austerity measures in the two periods, with insignificant marginal 
effects before the Great Recession and negative ones after the onset of the crisis (even if 
controlled by unemployment and growth). In the text we have demonstrated how these 
average effects should be further split depending on several conditional factors, 
improving/moderating the substantial effect of austerity in the crisis period.  
Thus, all these interacting models confirm the same results obtained in the text by adopting a split-
sample research design.  
 
  
  
Robustness 
 
For robustness, we included a series of alternative model specifications in regard to the economic 
variables used.  
Firstly, we replicated the full models replacing the level of unemployment with its trend variable, and 
then adding the latter to the original model (Table A.5).  
The results presented in the text are confirmed. Austerity behaves exactly as before (and as 
expected), with a coefficient which is not statistically significant before the crisis and that turns 
negative and highly significant during the Great Recession. Amongst the economic variables, the level 
of unemployment is the one that mostly triggers the economic vote, with growth being only 
sometimes weakly significant, and the trend in unemployment having the correct negative sign but 
never reaching a sufficient level of statistical significance. 
 
Table A.5 Complete models with austerity, separating level and trend in unemployment 
 Before the crisis 
(2000-2007) 
During the crisis 
(2008-2015) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Lagged vote 0.71*** 0.67*** 0.80*** 0.78*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) 
Unemployment  -0.81**  -0.49** 
  (0.37)  (0.22) 
Trend unemployment  -1.53 -1.47 -0.06 -0.06 
 (1.48) (1.46) (1.07) (1.04) 
Growth 0.38 0.38 1.01* 0.83 
 (0.65) (0.63) (0.56) (0.55) 
Austerity 0.02 0.29 -1.65*** -1.27** 
 (1.20) (1.18) (0.62) (0.63) 
Coalition 5.76* 5.21* 1.66 1.46 
 (3.11) (2.99) (2.87) (2.78) 
Enep -1.89** -1.42 -1.40** -1.29* 
 (0.88) (0.87) (0.71) (0.68) 
Trend turnout -0.11 -0.17 0.27 0.28* 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) 
  
Constant 12.33* 18.43** 6.55 11.57** 
 (7.39) (7.70) (4.93) (5.34) 
     
Observations 70 70 80 80 
R-squared 0.483 0.535 0.571 0.599 
Countries 34 34 36 36 
Random effects; Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Conditional models 
 
We report below the full models of the conditional models presented in the article. The low statistical 
significance of the interaction terms does not in any respect affect the substance of the finding. As 
Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) have made clear, we should not be interested in the significance 
of those coefficients, but directly in the marginal effects of our covariate at different intensities of 
the interacting term (Berry, Golder and Milton, 2012; Kam and Franzese, 2007). 
Table A.6 The conditional models of Figure 1 in the article 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
Lagged vote 0.72*** 0.83*** 0.84*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Unemployment -0.64*** -0.39* -0.46** 
 (0.24) (0.23) (0.21) 
Growth 0.90** 0.57 0.59 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.42) 
Austerity -10.10* -0.26 -0.76 
 (5.92) (0.82) (0.72) 
Inequality 0.50   
 (0.34)   
IMF  -3.27  
  (3.27)  
Expenditures vs Taxes   -0.46 
   (0.41) 
Austerity*Inequality 0.27   
 (0.18)   
Austerity*IMF  -2.60*  
  (1.35)  
Austerity*Exp vs Tax   -0.38* 
   (0.21) 
  
Coalition 4.19 0.19 1.11 
 (3.16) (2.84) (2.59) 
Enep -1.53** -1.17* -1.36** 
 (0.70) (0.68) (0.64) 
Trend turnout 0.28* 0.27* 0.29* 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Constant -0.83 9.56* 9.62* 
 (10.86) (5.21) (5.20) 
    
Observations 75 80 80 
R-squared -- 0.624 0.643 
Countries 34 36 36 
Note: R-squared is not computed for multiple imputations. 
  
Tax-based vs Expenditure-based fiscal adjustment 
 
In the text we have interacted austerity with an index measuring the internal balance between service 
cuts and tax increases, using the IMF Fiscal Monitor data for expenditures and revenues.  
An alternative way to test potentially different effects of the two major components of fiscal 
readjustments is to include them directly in a regression model as in Table A.6. The first model 
includes only the trend in expenditures, model 2 only the trend in taxation, and the full model 3 both 
of them. 
The results are coherent with the conditional model proposed in the article, with, besides the well-
known role of unemployment, only the increase in taxation levels triggering the punishment of 
incumbents. 
 
Table A.7 Tax-based and Expenditure based adjustment and incumbents’ performance during the 
crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
Lagged vote 0.78*** 0.77*** 0.79*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Unemployment -0.64*** -0.62*** -0.65*** 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Growth 0.65 0.78* 0.53 
 (0.43) (0.41) (0.43) 
Trend expenditures -0.54  -0.62 
 (0.39)  (0.39) 
Trend revenues  -1.67* -1.73* 
  (0.97) (0.97) 
Coalition 0.77 0.92 0.80 
 (2.71) (2.77) (2.67) 
Enep -1.30* -1.25* -1.24* 
 (0.67) (0.69) (0.66) 
Trend turnout 0.34** 0.25 0.29* 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Constant 13.84*** 13.28** 13.38*** 
  
 (5.26) (5.23) (5.19) 
    
Observations 80 80 80 
R-squared 0.588 0.591 0.606 
Countries 36 36 36 
Random effects; Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
  
Inequality and austerity 
 
The problem in interacting inequality and austerity was once again the availability of data. We chose 
the Gini index as a measure of income inequality, and the best source of data for the country and 
period covered in the article is the World Bank dataset.  
Unfortunately, even that source has some missing data. Because of the way in which we computed 
the weighted average for each of our variables, adjusting the index to the timing of the election, the 
problem of missing values was further magnified. We needed two consecutive annual data points to 
estimate our trimester adjusted measure. 
 
Table A.8 Interacting austerity and inequality (two different imputation strategies) 
 Multiple Average for 
 imputation Missing values 
   
Lagged vote 0.72*** 0.76*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
Unemployment weighted -0.64*** -0.58** 
 (0.24) (0.22) 
Growth weighted 0.90** 0.89** 
 (0.41) (0.41) 
Austerity -10.10* -10.73** 
 (5.92) (4.98) 
Inequality 0.50 0.37 
 (0.34) (0.27) 
Austerity*Inequality 0.27 0.29* 
 (0.18) (0.15) 
Coalition 4.19 4.02 
 (3.16) (3.05) 
Enep -1.53** -1.49** 
 (0.70) (0.69) 
Trend turnout 0.28* 0.28* 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
Constant -0.83 0.95 
 (10.87) (9.53) 
   
Observations 75 75 
Number of id 34 34 
  
R-squared -- 0.649 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: R-squared is not computed for multiple imputations. 
In order to moderate the problem, in the analysis conducted for the article we used a multiple 
imputation strategy. Using Amelia2 we estimated 5 different distributions that were stacked into the 
original dataset. We then applied to the estimated Gini index the usual transformation for adapting 
the annual measure to the timing of the election, and finally checked our model by using the multiple 
imputation estimation procedure in Stata. The results already presented in the first column of table 
A.4 produce the marginal effects plotted in the article in first panel of figure 1.  
We also adopted a second, more direct, strategy to fill the gaps in our sample: whenever a data point 
was missing, we imputed the average of the two closest measures before and after that missing value. 
Eventually, we imputed 15.8% of the annual observations, although not all of them were relevant to 
computing the level of inequality at the timing of an election. Nonetheless, with both strategies, we 
were obliged to reduce the number of countries included in the model to 34, for a total amount of 
75 elections. The results of the model using this second imputation are presented in table A.7.  
We plotted the marginal effects of our second imputation in figure A.3, and they substantially 
correspond to those presented in the article. 
 
 
  
 
Figure A.3 The conditional role of inequality on austerity vote adopting our second imputation of 
missing values 
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i. Hübscher and Sattler (2017) demonstrate that these results tend to underestimate the electoral 
risks connected with fiscal adjustments because they fail to consider the strategic choices of 
governments that concentrate the necessary consolidation in the honeymoon period after the 
election hoping to have the time to dilute the electoral consequences before the end of their 
mandate.  
ii. To our knowledge, rising inequality per se has only rarely been considered an issue triggering 
electoral punishment (Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck, 2019b), and it has never been taken into 
account as a factor conditioning that behavior.  
iii. The complete list is the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
 
  
 
United States. Other OECD countries, like Mexico and Chile, have been excluded from the 
analysis either because of the democratic requirement, or because of their recent access to the 
international organization and lack of consistent data. The codebook and some descriptive 
statistics of the main variables can be retrieved in the online appendix. 
iv. We did not consider the second ballots that were retaken in Greece in 2012 and 2015, because 
there could not be any retrospective evaluation of incumbents that had been in place for only a 
few weeks. We also discarded the 2000 Croatian election, since there was no previously 
democratically elected government. Some countries had missing fiscal data before 2008, and the 
elections considered were reduced to 70.  
v. Cyprus, Ireland and Latvia had sequences of contractionary manoeuvres topping a 9 point 
overall fiscal consolidation.  
vi. We report the coefficients of the full models in the online appendix. 
vii. As shown in the online appendix, the inclusion of the two extreme cases does not modify the 
interpretation. Actually, in Estonia, after an expenditure-based manoeuvre, the coalition in 
government expanded its support, whereas in Ireland, after a tax-based contraction, it topped a 
record loss of 26.9% of the votes.  
viii. Sometimes it is the reappointment of the same president or prime minister, sometimes the 
confirmation of his or her party at the head of the cabinet, and sometimes a government is 
considered to be terminated in case of ideological change of the coalition. In his qualitative 
assessment, Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (2019: 183-187) consider a success story the 
reappointment of David Cameron in 2015, after the Cons-Libdem coalition, in spite of the fact 
that the parties composing that cabinet lost more than 14% of the votes compared to 2010. The 
same authors deny the possibility of judging the Italian 2013 electoral tsunami after the 
technocratic Monti cabinet as connected to its economic policies (whereas see Bellucci, 2014). 
They further consider Rajoy’s 2016 fragile minority cabinet as further testimony that fiscal 
consolidation does not need to be politically fatal, even “after several years of austerity”. 
However, the authors overlook the inconclusive 2015 election, in which the Popular party lost 
almost 16% of the votes, and the overall record of a 314-day political stalemate that continued 
even after the repeated 2016 election, temporarily ended only because of the PSOE internal 
divisions (Salmon, 2017). Similar concerns could be advanced also for the reconstruction of the 
Irish and Portuguese cases (De Giorgi and Santana-Pereira, 2016; Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2014).         
